President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has published a summary of a new twenty-point peace proposal drafted with the United States. While presented as a pathway to ending the war in Ukraine, the plan is, in its current form, entirely detached from military and political reality. 

Compared to the earlier framework negotiated during negotiations with Russia by the US in November, it abandons the concessions that made peace plausible and replaces them with demands Moscow has no incentive to accept.

The plan bears some resemblance to the 28-point-framework drafted last month, but multiple conditions have been removed, and the deal has been altered on the whole to be a lot more in favour of Ukraine than the previous one, which was criticised as “a plan of capitulation and betrayal” by lawmakers.

The draft deal was expected to be delivered to the Kremlin sometime on Christmas Eve but disagreement on two areas of the deal between Washington and Kiev have stalled talks, which continue today at Mar-a-Lago. These concern the finer details regarding the proposed demilitarised areas along the Line of Control, as well as the future administration of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant.

I have reviewed both proposals and whilst the 28-point plan was shockingly conceding to Russia, this new proposal is frankly delusional. Not because it seeks peace, but because it assumes Russia will voluntarily surrender leverage, territory, and strategic objectives without coercion or compensation. 

If an agreement can arise from these proposals, it will only be following the complete renegotiation of most, if not all 20 points mentioned. Below, I will compare the two deals and provide my analysis on why this deal is a non-starter.

To prepare the reader and save those with little time, this deal would’ve been appropriate in the summer of 2023. Today, the demands set forth by Ukraine simply do not align with the reality on the ground. 

Refusing to rule out future Ukrainian NATO membership, the provision of article 5-like guarantees, Ukraine joining the EU, and refusing to recognise Russian sovereignty over the Donbas completely undermines Russia’s domestic reasoning for the war and renders the entire conflict effectively pointless.

Generally speaking, the first plan fundamentally addresses the cause of the war. From the Russian perspective, war in Ukraine was a necessary action to deter NATO expansion, and to restore Russian control over territory they consider theirs due to the majority ethnic Russian population in these regions.

It also places a heavy emphasis on the role that good Russo-American relations will have in maintaining peace, with multiple clauses included about US-Russia joint enterprises. It reads like an attempt to restore the blank slate that the two countries enjoyed immediately after the Cold War ended.

In contrast, the second plan ignores most of the causes of the war, and is phrased as a simple cessation of conflict, rather than an attempt at enduring peace. It is focused on curtailing Russia’s influence over Ukraine by placing it even closer to the West.

For the purposes of simplicity, I will henceforth refer to the plan drafted during the US-Russia talks as Plan A, and the most recent US-Ukraine proposal as Plan B.

Similarities

Whilst there have been many substantive changes made to the deal, there are some core points that remain the same, these include:

• Both deals explicitly state Ukraine is an independent and sovereign nation
• Violations of either agreement by Russia will trigger additional sanctions
• A policy of mutual non-aggression is to be pursued by both Ukraine and Russia
• Both parties are to agree not to alter their agreed upon borders, nor the terms of their peace through force
• Ukraine is to be given security guarantees that will be void in the event of Ukrainian aggression
• These security guarantees are to activate immediately should Russia invade Ukraine
• Ukraine remains committed to its status as a non-nuclear state
• There will be a long term reconstruction plan, as opposed to a short term aid programme. There will be World Bank involvement
• Ukraine will retain full access to the Dnipro River
• Ukraine will be allowed to export grain through the Black Sea without obstruction
• A maritime agreement on the Black Sea is to be negotiated to facilitate the above point 
• There is to be an all-for-all prisoner exchange, including civilian detainees
• A humanitarian committee is to be established to facilitate this
• Both countries to implement programmes in schools that promote tolerance and understanding

Nato and Strategic Outlook

• Plan A requires both Ukraine and NATO to implement a policy stating Ukraine is explicitly banned from joining. Plan B includes no such restriction.
• Plan A states no NATO troops will be stationed in Ukraine and that NATO will not expand further. Plan B omits this.
• Plan B provides “article 5-like” protections for Ukraine from NATO, effectively granting Ukraine the same security guarantees as a NATO member state.

Ukrainian Armed Forces

• Plan A mandates the AFU will be capped at 600,000 personnel, whilst Plan B increases this to 800,000.

Guarantees

• Plan A places the majority of responsibility for guaranteeing Ukraine’s security on the US, whereas Plan B proposes a split responsibility for guarantees, with European forces (led by the UK and France) working alongside the US.
• Plan A included explicit penalties to Ukraine for any additional striking of Moscow or St Petersburg, these have been omitted in Plan B
• Plan A contained provisions for the US to be compensated for providing guarantees, these have been removed in Plan B.

EU Membership

• Plan A made clear that Ukraine would not be obstructed in joining the EU, whereas Plan B has explicitly stated that Ukraine will join the EU within a set, although currently undefined timeline.

Territorial Settlement

• Plan A states that Ukraine will fully withdraw from the Donetsk region and that the Line of Control in Kerson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen as is. A DMZ is expected to form along the Line of Control, with the demilitarised zones being legally recognised as Russian territory. Russia is expected to withdraw from all areas not mentioned previously. 
• Plan B states that Ukraine will remain on the current Line of Control, whilst Russian forces will fully withdraw from Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. In addition, Russia will withdraw from parts of the border in Donetsk, allowing for a demilitarised zone along the Line of Control which is currently expected to materialise in the form of “free economic zones” in disputed areas. No formal agreement between Washington and Kiev has been made on this.
• Plan A is a permanent peace settlement which provides for a De Jure transfer of territory and the recognition of some seized regions as part of the Russian Federation. Namely Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions would be recognised as Russian territory. Plan B has removed all of this, and does not include any legal transfer of any part of Ukraine’s borders to Russia. Plan B would see that territory is settled along Lines of Control, instead of being cemented as new, legally defined borders.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant

• Plan A contained provisions for the plant to come under IAEA administration, with all energy produced being split 50/50 between Russia and Ukraine.
• Plan B has no set position on the plant, with it being a sticking point for negotiations between Washington and Kiev, currently, the proposals are as follows:
  • Washington seeks a trilateral solution, with the US, Ukraine, and Russia jointly administering the plant
  • Ukraine seeks a 50/50 split with the United States, removing all opportunity for Russian ownership of the plant.

Sanctions and the International Economy

• Plan A says sanctions on Russia are to be gradually lifted after peace is achieved, and provides a roadmap for Russia’s reintegration into the global economy. The US and Russia are expected to undertake multiple co-operative enterprises to improve relations including mutual cooperation in energy, AI, rare earth minerals, and arctic projects. Russia is also expected to be invited back to the G8 under these terms.
• Plan B removes all the provisions outlined in Plan A in this regard, there are no explicit mentions of if or when sanctions on Russia will be lifted, sanctions are only mentioned as something to be reintroduced later in the event of another invasion by Russia.

Frozen Russian Assets

• Plan A conditionally allows for the unfreezing of over $100bn in Russian assets, which will be placed into a US-led investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The US is expected to take 50% of profits generated by the fund, with the rest remaining in Ukraine. The remainder of Russian assets are to be unfrozen and placed in a joint investment fund shared between Russia and the US, which is expected to fund the mutually cooperative ventures mentioned earlier.
• Plan B removes any and all mention of profit sharing or asset unfreezing. Zelenskyy hopes to raise in excess of $800bn for the reconstruction of Ukraine, this is most likely going to come in the form of interest-free loans brokered by states that have seized Russian assets.

Elections and Amnesty

• Plan A states Ukraine must hold elections within 100 days of the deal taking effect. It also grants total amnesty from prosecution for all parties involved in the war.
• Plan B states Ukraine is to hold elections “as soon as possible”. No amnesty given.

Nuclear Arms Control

• Both plans reaffirm that Ukraine will remain non-nuclear capable.
• Plan A would see Russia and the US extend the START, as well as other nuclear control agreements.
• Plan B makes no mention of US-Russia agreements on nuclear arms control.

Ideology, Culture, and Media

• Plan A states Ukraine will enshrine into law an explicit ban on “Nazi ideology” which presumably will make Banderism illegal to support in the country. This was removed in Plan B.
• Plan A states that both countries will guarantee freedom of language, with Russian and Ukrainian media and education being protected in both nations. Plan B states that instead both countries will adopt educational programs to teach tolerance and diversity, in accordance with EU standards.

Will it be accepted?

Now that we have gone through all of the differences between the deals, we will now discuss the likely next steps in the peace process. Particularly, how likely it is that the new “Plan B” will form the backbone of a peace settlement, and what a likely peace settlement will look like.

In short, Plan B is dead on arrival. There really is no other way to put it, the most recent proposal completely fails on multiple fronts.

Firstly, there is a large, material difference in what the two agreements seek to achieve. Mainly, Plan A recognises and seeks to nullify the cause of the war, whereas Plan B seeks to pause the state of war. Plan A gives a firm and permanent settlement, whereas Plan B leaves too many questions unanswered. 

For Russia, the invasion was framed as a defensive response to NATO expansion against the backdrop of increasingly hostile relations with the bloc, and a reclamation of historically Russian territories with ethnic majorities.

Any successful settlement will have to (at least partially) address the Kremlin’s strategic objectives outlined at the start of the war: The “liberation” of Russian-majority oblasts in the Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia; Ukrainian neutrality, the prevention of NATO expansion, as well as the demilitarisation and “denazification” of Ukraine.

Plan A directly confronts these by banning Ukrainian NATO membership, capping the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) at a lower level, and formalising Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. This offers Moscow a face-saving victory that aligns with its domestic narrative and allows them to claim an achievement (albeit partial) of their strategic objectives. 

Plan B, however, dismisses these core issues entirely: it omits any NATO restrictions, boosts the AFU cap to 800,000, and proposes vague "free economic zones" along the Donetsk line of control without de jure recognition of Russian gains, as well as Russian withdrawal from four oblasts.

This isn't negotiation, it's a Christmas list that should’ve gone to the North Pole two years ago. It assumes Russia will concede battlefield advantages without incentives, ignoring the reality of Moscow's advances in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. 

Secondly, Plan B's "Article 5-like" security guarantees are a pipe dream. These would effectively grant Ukraine NATO-level protections without formal membership, led by a coalition of the US, UK, and France. But Russia has repeatedly stated that any such arrangement is a red line, viewing it as backdoor NATO encroachment, the very trigger for the conflict. 

Plan A wisely sidesteps this by explicitly prohibiting NATO troops in Ukraine and halting alliance expansion, creating a neutral buffer that could de-escalate tensions.  In contrast, Plan B's guarantees lack legal entrenchment and congressional ratification, making them as unreliable as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that failed to protect Ukraine from invasion, with the stakes being much higher if they were to be acted upon.

Thirdly, the economic and sanctions elements expose Plan B's naivety. Plan A provides a clear roadmap for lifting sanctions, reintegrating Russia into the G8, and fostering joint US-Russian ventures in energy, AI, and Arctic resources, mutual benefits that incentivise compliance. 

It even unfreezes Russian assets for shared investment funds, with the US taking a cut from Ukraine's reconstruction profits. Plan A lays the groundwork for a hard reset on Russia’s post-cold-war relations with the West, and seeks to address the three decades of bad feeling that have arisen since the collapse of the Soviet Union which helped cause the war.

Plan B scraps all this: no sanctions timeline, no joint projects, and an aspirational $800 billion reconstruction fund which will likely be reliant on interest-free loans from asset-holding states, without Russian buy-in. In essence, Plan B enshrines Russia’s status as a long-term enemy of the West.

Zelenskyy's claim that the plan is "90% ready" rings hollow when Russia has only been "briefed" and shows no shift from its territorial maximalism and existing red lines. Why would Putin accept a deal that offers no economic relief while demanding withdrawals from gains like parts of Donetsk, where the AFU is on the brink of being forced out? 

Finally, unresolved hotspots like the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant and demilitarized zones highlight Plan B's incompleteness. Plan A proposes IAEA administration with a 50/50 energy split; Plan B waffles between trilateral control (US preference) and a US-Ukraine split (Kiev's demand), excluding Russia entirely. 

On territory, Plan B's "stay where we are" along current lines ignores Russia's control over 18% of Ukraine and demands withdrawals from regions like Kharkiv without reciprocity. These are fantastical demands given Russia's military momentum and Putin's unyielding stance. 

Likely Next Steps in the Peace Process

As Zelenskyy and Trump convene at Mar-a-Lago today, the new deal is poised for deadlock. Russia, briefed on the draft but mostly unresponsive, is unlikely to budge without territorial concessions or sanctions relief, which are absent from Plan B. 

Recent escalations, like the 10-hour drone barrage on Kiev, signal Moscow's disdain for the proposal. Expect Russia to reject it outright, forcing new talks.

The most likely outcome is a hybrid deal starting from Plan A's framework. This could feasibly retain some plan B elements, namely the EU timeline and reconstruction ambitions but incorporate Plan A's NATO bans, territorial exchange, and economic incentives to lure Russia. 

Trump, emphasising America’s role in securing peace in Ukraine, may push for joint ventures and asset unfreezing to normalise US-Russia ties, echoing post-Cold War optimism. Without this pivot, Plan B risks prolonging the war well into 2026 and beyond, as Ukraine's "90% ready" claim masks deep rifts over Donbas and Zaporizhzhia. 

In summary, the recent 20-point-proposal is a delusional overreach, misaligned with current battlefield realities and Russian red lines. Ukraine is rapidly approaching the point where any kind of negotiation becomes undesirable, as the situation on the battlefield looks increasingly in Russia’s favour. As President Trump stated at the beginning of the year “you’re not in a good position”.

Peace in Ukraine will not be achieved by pretending Russia is losing, and that Kiev has all the cards. Any settlement that ignores Russian objectives, the line of control, and Russia’s relationship with the West is not a peace plan at all. It is a backwards display of pageantry that only increases the likelihood that the war will not end through negotiation, but through desolation.